Friday, October 19, 2012

The Anxiety of Dissolution


Berlant and Warner (in “What Does Queer Theory Teach Us about X?”) would like to resist an easy categorization. Varying ideas and works should not be grouped under the term “queer theory” insofar as this term might be assumed to have “stable referential content and pragmatic force” (344). They are proposing that queer commentary describe a set of ideas and works united, perhaps, only through their emphasis on a kind of practice—particularly the practice of dissolving existing identity categories.

Heartbreak House describes a group of people caught in a corrupt structure. Many of the characters attempt to take advantage of this structure in order to benefit (often by taking advantage of the others), but each finds him/herself ultimately powerless. What they celebrate, in the end, is the partial destruction of their home. This destruction also comes with the death of two of the most reprehensible characters: the Burglar, who has previously attempted to swindle the rest out of some money, and Mangan, whose position is the result of both his exploitation of laborers and his lies to Ellie’s father. As an audience, it is to be expected that we might celebrate the end of these two villains. And yet there is something decidedly disturbing about watching Ellie, for example, after the threat has passed:

MRS HUSHABYE. But what a glorious experience! I hope they’ll come again tomorrow night.
ELLIE (radiant at the prospect) Oh, I hope so.
Randall at last succeeds in keeping the home fires burning on his flute (117).

The audience may rejoice to see the end of two such obviously harmful figures; but, by celebrating, we also seem to join in Ellie’s wish for her own destruction. In other words, we are implicated in the desire to simply end everything—to let the whole corrupt structure come crashing down.

Shaw wrote Heartbreak House in 1913—just before the outbreak of WWI—but the play remained unpublished and unproduced until after the war, explicitly because of its odd relationship to the idea of destruction. There is a deep ambivalence, I would argue, throughout the play. It asks for the downfall of corruption, and criticizes the immobility of its characters. And yet the destruction of the characters’ world, as a solution to their dissolute ways, does not seem to offer an acceptable answer. It leaves us simultaneously celebrating and abhorring the end of their world.

Both of the terms used by Berlant and Warner—queer theory and queer commentary—have an investment in the political. Fundamental to the destruction of categories is a resistance to the power structures that imbue such categories. And Berlant and Warner are careful to explain that this destruction is not meant as a loss of political possibility, but rather as a resistance to problematic political modes. They write, “the failure to systematize the world in queer theory does not mean a commitment to irrelevance; it means resistance to being an apparatus for falsely translating systematic and random violences into normal states, administrative problems, or minor constituencies” (348). And yet, I think Heartbreak House points to the anxiety that such an approach can lead to. The destruction of categories, as a political project, is valuable. But it does not seem to have an answer for how people might live, except in continually exercising this facility. Heartbreak House describes the temptation to destroy systems. But is also leaves us with the fear that this is not enough—that we will be left with a house in ruins and nowhere to go.

Despite Derrida’s discussion of the endless creativity and celebration that we should associate with the realization of an empty center, his arguments seem as though they might leave us without the possibility of political action. Queer commentary, as described by Berlant and Warner, is of course unwilling to give up the possibility of political action. But it is inherently unstable, a program that by its very nature seeks to undercut itself, “a culture whose marginal history makes it inevitably controverted” (349). Heartbreak House expresses the fear that destruction, without simultaneously introducing new modes of being, is empty. And it reminds us of just how much courage it will take to move away from those places in which we are comfortable. “Let us all go out into the night and leave everything behind us,” cries Hector. But not one of the characters can bring him/herself to do it. It is cold outside. And besides, there is breakfast in the morning.

5 comments:

  1. One might add to this Patterson's warning. We live in a culture that increasingly tells itself myths about exploded boundaries and self-generated identities, but they are just that: myths. Paradoxically, we are most at risk of unconsciously playing the roles meted out to us by power structures precisely when we think we have gotten beyond such structures, when we think of ourselves as autonomous and free. Perhaps a better solution would be a Nietzschean perennial suspicion of categories and especially those categories one is tempted to shirk or embrace; paired with a Nietzschean ambitious "yes" to the dangerous project of living a life justifiable to oneself "as an aesthetic phenomenon." Or maybe I'm just on a Nietzsche bender today. (:

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  2. I’m so glad you mentioned this, Kenny! I didn’t even think of Patterson’s ideas when I was writing my post, but this is such an important point to make. I think the play may agree with you, as the actual taking-apart of anything in Heartbreak House is a double myth. Not only does the final scene describe, to a large degree, a failure of destruction (the bombers don’t actually hit the house; we are simply told that something has been wrecked offstage; and the majority of the ending is devoted to the characters romanticizing the possibility, rather than the actuality, of the house being hit), but even the bombers are ultimately a theatrical illusion (I think the theatre is a form especially suited to the discussion of myths/illusions, as it always involves our participation in a physical myth/illusion). I’m not sure I can get away with claiming that Heartbreak House also goes so far as to embrace a radical suspicion of all categories—it may, but I’m cautious of asserting this, because it reads exceedingly allegorically—but there is definitely a sense that destruction is not simply an anxiety-inducing program, but also potentially impossible: a frightening and unachievable myth.

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  3. Your post reminds me of the inherently self-contradictory practice of skepticism. One can argue all day about Zeno’s paradox and the impossibility of movement yet move nevertheless. Skepticism is a non-starter. Insofar as skepticism is about destroying foundations it seems to be a cousin to the political problem you address in your post. What do we put in place of a system that should be destroyed? This is a problem that produces anxiety. And yet, how should this anxiety be interpreted? Queer commentary attempts to break apart identity categories. What happens next?—the kind of openness not yet experienced. Possibly, to “go out into the night and leave everything behind us,” is the very action necessary for real political change.

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  4. Tom, since I consider myself a skeptic I would like to take issue (hopefully in a non-trollish way) with your statement that "Skepticism is a non-starter." While I would agree that it is very silly indeed to conclude that motion does not exist on the basis of one's inability to solve Zeno's paradoxes, I also think they've been immensely useful in forcing philosophers and mathematicians to carefully evaluate what they mean by terms like "infinite," "continuous," etc., over the years in order to make sure they aren't talking nonsense. If our ways of thinking about things like motion, change, causality, and so on are internally inconsistent (which is what Zeno is trying to show), that will lead to all sorts of mistakes down the line. And yeah, sometimes the beliefs that seem self-evident really are false: political absolutism, various religious beliefs, sexism and racism all seemed (and seem) self-evident in many times and places. Philosophical skepticism at its best looks critically at the foundations of concepts so intuitive that they are rarely questioned, and often finds them shaky indeed. This doesn't mean the project of understanding our world should be abandoned, it just means we need to go back to the drawing board and maybe not be so arrogant in future about what we think we know.

    Sorry to get all preachy. Re-reading your post, maybe I misinterpreted your stance on skepticism; if so, apologies for making a big speech to no purpose.

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  5. I completely agree with you. My statement was meant to show a way of thinking about skepticism that is very common. I should have said "apparently self-contradictory" and "seems like non-starter." In my opinion, skepticism does everything that you describe. Not preachy at all. :-)

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